DISTINGUISHING JUSTIFICATIONS FROM
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I
INTRODUCTION
Ann swings her arm and injures Ben. She faces moral condemnation and
legal liability unless she can offer an explanation that absolves her of full
blame. She might make a claim of justification that, despite initial
appearances, her action was desirable or proper, or she might make a claim of
excuse that she does not bear full responsibility for injuring Ben. If Ann is
fully justified, she will not be subject to blame or to classification as a weak or
defective person. If Ann is excused, she may be regarded as wholly or partly
free of blame, but she will have demonstrated weakness or some defect.
Because the moral evaluation of a justified actor differs from the moral
evaluation of an excused actor, deciding whether Ann is justified or excused is
an important moral question.
In the legal context, a defendant who successfully establishes the legal
analogue of a moral justification or excuse is typically relieved of liability.
Because of the injury to Ben, it is likely that Ann will be prosecuted for
assault, which is defined as "purposely, knowingly, or recklessly causing
bodily injury to another."' Nevertheless, Ann may offer an exonerating
explanation that precludes satisfaction of the basic elements of the crime or
that, conceding the presence of the basic elements, precludes liability on
other grounds.
In modern American criminal law the terms "justification" and "excuse"
only refer to the second kind of explanation-that is, they concede the
presence of the basic elements but deny liability on independent grounds. If
Ann acknowledges that she intentionally hit Ben but did so to prevent him
from detonating a bomb, she offers ajustification; if she says that she decided
to hit him because she was insane, she offers an excuse.
There are other explanations that exonerate an actor from liability because
they preclude satisfaction of the basic elements of a crime. These
explanations are similar to justifications or excuses but are not labelled as
such by the law. If Ann says she had to take the risk that her swinging arm
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would injure Ben in order to protect Carol from David's deadly attack, she
effectively denies that her actions were reckless, since recklessness involves
the conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. 2 If Ann says she
was flailing her arms for dramatic effect, unaware that Ben was standing close
by, she denies the minimal culpability requirement of conscious risk-taking.
In admitting clumsiness, Ann removes her actions from the ambit of assault.3
As J.L. Austin noted in A Pleafor Excuses, "[when] I have broken your dish...
maybe the best defense that I can find will be clumsiness." 4 The second half
of this article notes that many exonerating explanations that look like
justifications and excuses concern the basic elements of offenses and explains
why this fact bears strongly on the expectations one should have from the
legal system in distinguishing justifications from excuses more narrowly
understood.
If the exclusive purpose of criminal law were to allocate an appropriate
amount of punishment to those accused of doing wrong, the law would not
need to distinguish between justifications and excuses. But because it reflects
and reinforces moral judgments, criminal law should illuminate the moral
status of various courses of action, and the community should be concerned
with the reason a particular individual goes unpunished. If, without cost, the
legal system could work sharp, clear distinctions between justifications and
excuses, such distinctions would be desirable.
This article discusses the impediments to these clear distinctions. 5 Section
II focuses on the central feature that distinguishes justifications from excuses.
Section III addresses situations in which ordinary concepts ofjustification and
excuse leave uncertainty as to which label to apply. Troubling borderline
situations need not pose significant hurdles to moral evaluation, which does
not have to accept either-or labels. But traditional puzzles about moral
appraisal do impinge on the distinction between justification and excuse.
Section IV considers the implication of the distinction between justification
and excuse for the law's necessarily more rigid labels. Because of this rigidity,
the law should not aim for comprehensive, precise distinctions between
justification and excuse.

2. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
3. Another explanation Ann might give is that her arm moved because of a strong electric
shock. In this situation, her action would not satisfy the requirement that a crime involve a voluntary
act or omission. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (1985).
4.
Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 6, 7 (H. Morris ed. 1961).
5. The article builds on Greenawalt, The PerplexingBorders ofJustification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1897 (1984). Although the basic themes remain the same, the organization here is different and
some points are new or more fully developed.
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II
BASIC CRITERIA FOR DISTINGUISHING JUSTIFICATIONS FROM EXCUSES

A.

Warranted Action As the Central Feature of Justification and
Nonresponsibility As the Central Feature of Excuse

When something is fully justified, it is warranted. A justified belief is a
belief based on good grounds; a justified action is a morally appropriate
action. When something is fully excused, it is not warranted, but the person
involved is not blameworthy. An excusable belief is one that a person cannot
be blamed for holding; 6 an excusable action is one for which a person is not
fully responsible. This is the central distinction between justification and
excuse. Insofar as others are responsible and have the power of choice, they
would do well to replicate a justified action but to avoid an act like that
excused.
Occasionally commentators have suggested other distinguishing
characteristics as central to the distinction. 7 For example, it has been argued
that justifications are general, applying to everyone in the same situation, and
8
excuses are individual, relating to the characteristics of the particular actor.
Although a substantial correlation of this type does exist, some legal excuses
as well as some moral appraisals have objective components: their application
depends on how ordinary people would react to difficult conditions. If, as this
article claims, justifications depend partly on an actor's state of mind, then
they do take account of an important individual characteristic.
Another proposed distinction concerns the rights of others. Generally,
justified acts may be aided and not prevented, and excused acts may be
prevented but not aided. These correlations, however, are imperfect. In the
field of moral evaluation, one can speak of clashing courses of action as
justified. A person may be morally justified in shielding a family member
from the police, and the police may be morally justified in searching the
person's apartment to find the family member. On occasion, the law may also
privilege competing courses of action. And if excused action may be stopped,
it may not always be stopped with the same tactics as unexcused action.
Perhaps Richard is morally and legally justified in shooting an ordinary
assailant who runs toward him with a knife in his apartment, even if he could
retreat. He may not, however, be justified in shooting if he knows the
assailant is crazy.
Much more could be said about these other divisions, which correlate
fairly well, although not precisely, with the distinction between warranted and
unwarranted action. I shall assume in what follows, however, that in morality
6. Someone might, for example, lack solid rational basis for a belief, but be "excused" because
his parents powerfully instilled that belief during childhood.
7. The distinctions are explored at greater length in Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 1915-27; see
also Dressier, New Thoughts about the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's
Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61 (1984).
8. See Dressler, supra note 7, at 67; Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 1915.
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and law the distinction between warranted and unwarranted action is the
critical distinction between justification and excuse.
B.

Partial Exonerations

Partial exonerations present a more difficult decision about terminology.
It is easy to determine how to treat partial excuses, which diminish
responsibility. Assume, for example, that Ben has taunted Ann so that she
strikes out. Lacking full control over her actions, Ann is less to blame for
intentionally hitting Ben than if she had acted with deliberation. The law may
recognize the lower level of blame by imposing a lesser punishment. 9
The more difficult questions concern partial justifications. In one sense, a
partial justification can undoubtedly exist. It is possible to justify one aspect
or initial stage of action even though there is no justification for another
aspect or subsequent stage. Suppose, for example, that Ben starts to slap
Ann. She responds initially with appropriate force but continues to hit Ben
after disabling him. Ann was justified in using moderate force, but her
continued hitting was unwarranted. Taken as a whole, her action could be
viewed as partially justified.1 0
It is more difficult to determine, however, how to characterize the situation
in which an act is wrong in its entirety but not as wrong as it might otherwise
have been. Ann has learned that Ben has misused her close friend. She
strikes him as part of a careful plan to hurt and embarrass him and to teach
him a lesson. Ann's assault is unjustified but it is not as unjustified as assaults
committed for selfish or trivial motives. The reason for the act mitigates its
wrongfulness. Ann's partial exoneration bears little resemblance to most
excuses because it has nothing to do with the degree of her responsibility.
Indeed, she was fully responsible for her action. The reason that she is less
blameful is the same sort of reason that might fully justify her act; it differs
only in that it is less powerful. The conceptual difficulty is that the term
justification has an either-or quality that makes people hesitant to speak of a
partial justification when no aspect of the action is fullyjustified. Austin spoke
of "terms, such as 'extenuation,' 'palliation,' 'mitigation,' [that hover] uneasily
between partial justification and partial excuse."' I Describing an action as
partially justified when it is less inappropriate than it would otherwise be is
theoretically useful, 12 but it is important to note that this usage strains
9. Definitions of assault generally do not contain an explicit grading based on such factors,
although a judge's sentence may take them into account. Intentional killings which would otherwise
be murders are, however, typically reduced in grade to manslaughter if the actor responded to
provocation or was "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there
is reasonable explanation or excuse." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(b) and comment 5 (1985).
10. A similar characterization might be appropriate if she initially used a baseball bat. In such a
case, a degree of force would be justified but the excessive force would not be justified.
11. Austin, supra note 4, at 6.
12. That justification may be partial and may explain at least some provocation cases is
suggested in Bickenbach, The Defense of Necessity, 13 CAN. J. PHIL. 79, 87-88 (1983), and Dressler,
Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982).
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ordinary concepts. A partial justification in this sense is not the meaning that
is usually associated with partial justification.
III
TROUBLESOME EDGES IN MORAL EVALUATION

Sometimes an explanation falls within the general range of justifications
and excuses, but deciding on the appropriate label proves difficult. The
problem may concern the relations among behavior, consequences, and
knowledge, the coalescence of the elements of excuse and justification, or
divergences of moral appraisal.
A.

Behavior, Consequences, and Knowledge

One who makes a moral evaluation may focus on the actor's actual
behavior or its consequences. One may also focus on the behavior or likely
consequences as understood at the time of the act.
Some
1. Harmful Incidental Side Effects of Appropriate and Desirable Action.
if
controversial,
A
clear,
effects.
desirable acts have predictable unwanted
example is the traditional notion that bombing of military targets is justified
even if a consequence of this action is the death of a limited number of
innocent civilians. Under the traditional assumption, the act of bombing is
undoubtedly justified rather than excused. But what status does the killing of
innocent civilians have? One might argue: "The killing of the innocent
civilians is excused because the bombing was justified." This example
illustrates the degree to which labels of justification and excuse may depend
on the way in which the relevant inquiry into wrongfulness is framed. The
example also shows that the line between appropriateness and responsibility
blurs. One might say that because the act of bombing is not wrongful, the
actor's responsibility for the consequent innocent deaths is eliminated or
lessened. However, if the critical inquiry addresses the decision to bomb in
the first place, justification, and not excuse, is involved.
Human beings must act on facts they know
2. Facts and Perceivable Facts.
and consequences they expect, but acts that seem entirely appropriate often
turn out to have consequences so unfortunate that the actor would have acted
differently had he foreseen the consequences.
Victoria is brought unconscious into Frank's hospital. Only an immediate operation
will save Victoria's right leg. Although the chances of the operation causing death are
very slight, Victoria dies. An autopsy reveals that death occurred because she had a
weak heart valve-a factor that could not have been ascertained in advance.

Plainly, Frank was blameless in performing the operation, but was his action
justified or excused? The difficulty lies not in morally evaluating the situation,
but in expressing that evaluation. As with the bombing example, the
exonerating word that one chooses may depend on how one characterizes
Frank's actions. One might argue that his performance of the operation was
justified, but that his causing of Victoria's death was excused. This problem in
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expression partly stems from a pervasive problem in moral evaluation:
choosing whether to judge an act according to its actual or its expected
consequences. A person may distinguish his evaluation of the desirability of
the act from his evaluation of the actor's conduct. If one wants to make a
moral evaluation of Frank's behavior or to recommend behavior for others
faced with similar ascertainable facts, the word "justification" is much more
suitable than the word "excuse."
Some may argue that this conclusion fails to take into account the
distinction between perceptions of present facts and predictions of future
consequences. Thus, action based on a sensible prediction that turns out to
be wrong may be justified, but action based on a misestimation of present
facts may only be excused. Such reasoning, while intuitively appealing, is
flawed. If one accepts a rough determinism about natural events, 13 then one
understands that a mistaken prediction rests on ignorance of some presently
existing facts or general causal relationships. The distinction between present
perception and prediction collapses. Moreover, if present facts are
undiscoverable, a best estimate of these facts that turns out to be wrong is not
morally different from a best estimate of future consequences that turns out to
be wrong.
The line between facts that are unknowable and those that are knowable
but not discovered is not a better basis for distinguishing justifications from
excuses. If "unknowability" means inherently incapable of being known given
the present stage of human understanding, then Victoria's weak heart valve
was knowable. It could have been discovered if she had been killed and
dissected-hardly an appropriate procedure for a doctor considering surgery.
When the only way to determine a fact defeats the purpose for which one
needs to know the fact, the fact is "practically" unknowable. But suppose that
with sophisticated equipment and ample time for testing, Victoria's weak
heart valve could have been discovered without damage to her. Even
"knowability" in this sense is hardly relevant for a doctor who must act quickly
and does not have prompt access to the necessary equipment. So long as one
exercises the best possible judgment on the facts he can reasonably acquire,
the existence of other facts knowable only in some practically unimportant
sense is immaterial for purposes of moral evaluation. 14 His act is justified
even if, in retrospect, the estimation turns out to have been wrong.' 5 Neither
13. As it is used in this article, the phrase "rough determinism about natural events" dispenses
with two possibilities. One is that some indeterminacy infects the natural universe. Even if that were
so, most natural events in the near future might be considered predictable if there were perfect
information about all present facts. The second possibility is that human choice is not determined in
the way that natural events are. Even if that were so, such a possibility would not affect one's
conclusions about future events that do not depend on human choices made after one acts.
14. It is more troublesome to judge the act of one person when another person would have been
capable of making a more accurate estimation than the first person, and, consequently, would have
acted differently. I pass over the complexity here, but it is discussed briefly in Greenawalt, supra note
5, at 1909-10.
15. In this simple example, Frank thinks it highly probable that Victoria has an adequately
strong heart valve. If the best estimations are that a person has a 95% chance of dying quickly
without an operation and a 70% chance of dying during an operation, the doctor will operate,
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moral relevance nor ordinary usage supports distinguishing between
justification and excuse on the basis of a line between unknowable and
knowable facts.
In the converse situation, an actor does something that he reasonably
believes will do harm but that turns out to be beneficial.
Ann strikes Ben solely out of personal hate. Unknown to Ann, Ben was about to
trigger a device to detonate a bomb in a crowded place. Ann's blow makes Ben drop
the device, which breaks and is rendered harmless.

Given the facts available to Ann, her act was wrongful, but it turned out to be
highly desirable. Excuse is not an option; either Ann's act is justified or it is
wrongful and not excused. Again, human expression is sufficiently rich to
differentiate Ann's behavior from its consequences. One might argue that
Ann was wrong to hit Ben but her actions turned out to have been warranted.
However, if the central purpose is to evaluate Ann's moral status, Ann's act
must be termed unjustified.
3. Blameworthy Factual Mistakes.
Ascribing the proper characterization to
acts based on avoidable factual mistakes is particularly difficult. If Frank,
possessing the capabilities of an ordinary doctor, 16 unreasonably fails to
detect Victoria's condition, then he is somewhat blameworthy for performing
the operation, though less so than would be a surgeon who knew the
operation was too dangerous. One could argue that Frank offers a partial
justification for what he has done. However, because his state of mind seems
to go to his degree of responsibility for his actions and their consequences, his
negligent ignorance is better characterized as a partial excuse.' 7 He is
therefore less responsible than one who performs such an operation with full
8
awareness of its dangers.'
although the patient probably will not survive the operation. More complex language than is used in
the text would be required to cover the case, but the best estimate of probabilities would render the
operation justified.
16. When people like doctors make decisions on the basis of their special skills and training, the
standard of comparison is another person who has those skills and training. What if the actor has
lesser capabilities than the ordinary professional, or the ordinary person in his situation, and has
made the best perception possible for him? To take a stark example, imagine that a deaf person
performs an act that a hearing person easily would have perceived as undesirable. One would
probably say he was excused by his inability to hear, rather than that he was justified under the
circumstances. Though if one were very precise, one might say that given his deafness, his action was
justified. If I am correct that perceptual inadequacies are usually considered excuses, then this fact
suggests that notions ofjustification usually assume the standpoint of an ordinary person in the given
situation.
17. If partial excuse is the best label for acts done because of negligent misconceptions, what if a
person makes a reasonable appraisal of the facts but one that is less accurate than was possible for
him or any ordinary person in his situation? Is he then only excused, because of falling short of the
best possible appraisal, or justified, because of acting on an appraisal that was appropriate? The
answer to this terminological question is closely linked to how perfectionist one's view of morality is,
an issue explored infra text accompanying notes 19-21.
18. The example demonstrates the importance of the standard with which one compares the
actual state of affairs. If comparison is with a state of blameless misperception, then the statement
that Frank was negligently ignorant is not an exoneration of any kind.
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The reasonableness of one's failure to perceive ajustifyingfact is irrelevant
to moral evaluation and the characterization of one's act. If Ann might have
discovered easily that Ben was about to detonate the bomb, her act of striking
Ben would not be less blameworthy than it would be if her ignorance was
unavoidable. Nor is the act more blameworthy, since Ann had no moral duty
to determine that her act might actually be less wrong than she supposed. 19
B.

Coalescence of Elements

Some situations generate elements of both justification and excuse.
Separating the threads proves troublesome when one aims to ascribe labels to
an act. Unexpected natural events or human threats can create "necessitous
circumstances," which force individuals to risk grave danger or perform acts
that would otherwise be wrong. A mountain climber in a snowstorm must
break into a cabin to save his life; a man must drive a getaway car for
murderers or be killed by them.
Two grounds of excuse are present. Emotional upheaval and irrationality
often result from extreme situations. People in those states are considered
less responsible for their actions and less blameworthy for their wrong choices
than people operating under normal conditions. Notions of involuntariness
concern not only an actor's mental state but also the objective conditions
under which he acts. If someone else has imposed grossly unfair conditions of
choice, one may say a person is not responsible for what he does even if he
acts with calm deliberation.
Crucial elements of justification also are involved. If the danger is severe
enough, the choice to perform an act that would otherwise be wrongful will be
morally desirable. The desirability of the choice is clear in the mountain
climber's case. And, whatever one may think about driving a getaway car for
murderers, if the choice were between being killed or stealing a diamond, the
theft would be preferable. Even when the actor's behavior is not fully
justified, the danger he averts may support a claim of partial justification.
What label should one affix for purposes of moral evaluation when both
elements ofjustification and excuse are present? Because the word "excuse"
connotes a degree of weakness, one should refer to acts as "justified"
whenever they are warranted. Where the act is unwarranted, but the actor
satisfies the requirements of excuse, then one ought to use the term "excuse".
When the presence of both elements reduces but does not eliminate blame,
no simple answer to the terminological question exists, although the
connotations of partial justification may lead people to feel more comfortable
with the term "partial excuse."

19. The conclusion that the reasonableness of her ignorance is morally irrelevant also obtains if,
contrary to what has been suggested, the actual facts compel regarding her striking Ben as justified.
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Divergences of Moral Evaluation

Clear conceptual categorization cannot alone resolve whether particular
acts are wrongful without qualification, justified, excused, partially justified, or
partially excused. So long as people disagree over what actions are morally
right and what impairments relieve one of responsibility, they will disagree
about how to characterize acts.
1. Variant Approaches to the Nature of Morality.
The problem of
distinguishing justifications from excuses extends beyond differing moral
judgments about individual situations. Indeed, it reaches the heart of diverse
concepts of morality. The conflict centers on the extent to which one's
morality demands the best possible action and the means by which one
determines which actions are morally preferable.
Joan chooses to take an expensive vacation rather than donate to famine relief the
$3,000 she has saved.

Assume that Joan would have acted in a morally preferable way if she had
foregone her vacation and contributed to famine relief.20 One way of viewing
Joan's decision is that it was morally wrong but that it reflected a common
selfishness. Therefore, she is entirely or partially excused. From a contrary
perspective, Joan has no duty to contribute. Although making the
contribution would have been a praiseworthy, supererogatory act, her
decision to take a vacation was within the range of morally permissible acts
and was therefore justified. Some moralities, including Christian
perfectionism and act-utilitarianism, draw no principled distinction between
duty and supererogatory acts. These moralities maintain that one ought
always to do what is morally best. Other moral approaches view duty as
limited to minimal respect for the rights and welfare of others, leaving
individuals free to choose their actions when duty is not implicated. The
position one adopts may determine whether one labels an act as justified or as
excused.
Apart from demanding various degrees of perfection, moral perspectives
differ widely in the grounds they assign for moral preferability. A sharp split
exists between deontological and consequentialist approaches. 2' This article
focuses on two subjects of disagreement: special relationships and individual
shortcomings.
Lyle helps his sister hide from the police, although he knows she has killed a person
and he reasonably believes she may kill again.

20. Perhaps a believer in an "invisible hand" that renders selfish actions socially desirable would
say her actual choice is morally indifferent or even preferable, but what matters for purposes of this
discussion is the difference in view among those who agree that the donation would have been
morally better.
21. Briefly, a consequential approach makes the morality of an act turn on whether it produces,
or will predictibly produce, a more favorable balance of consequences than alternatives. A
deonotological approach makes the morality of an act depend, at least partly, on some independent
quality of the act.
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Lyle realizes that society's welfare would best be served by not aiding his
sister, but feels a powerful family obligation to assist her. Does morality
require Lyle to take a disinterested perspective or should he give special
weight to his relationship to his sister? Even from a disinterested perspective
the relationship will matter since his sister will be more hurt and resentful if
Lyle refuses to help than if a remote acquaintance does so. But may Lyle give
more weight to his relationship with his sister than the disinterested utilitarian
perspective would allow? A straightforward act-utilitarian would say "no."
From this perspective, if Lyle's refusal to aid his sister would predictably yield
22
better overall results, then Lyle's aid could at best be excused, not justified.
But one might defend Lyle's decision as justified if one views his obligation to
his sister as based on an independent moral ground that does not rest on, or
always yield to, a balance of social consequences. One might argue on behalf
of this view that individual lives and social relations are enriched if individuals
conceive of their family obligations as having primacy. From this perspective,
Lyle's decision to assist might be thought as good as, or preferable to, the
alternative.
Maude commits adultery, correctly believing that if she does not do so she will become
extremely frustrated and will inflict abuse on her children.

Assume that secret adultery violates a moral duty to a spouse. Maude
understands that the violation of this duty will help her to forestall future
violations of a duty towards her children. From an act-utilitarian perspective,
Maude is warranted in taking the fruits of her predictable frustration into
account; if her assessment is accurate, her adultery will be justified. Those
who take a more absolute view of duty do not concede that the likelihood of a
future violation of duty may justify a present violation of another duty. For
them, Maude's adultery is wrongful, although her self-awareness, if accurate,
may give her some kind of excuse or partial justification.
Each of these examples shows how the labels ofjustification and excuse tie
into broad moral theories. For Joan and Lyle, a deontological approach is
more likely to concede a justification than a consequential approach. For
Maude, the obverse holds true. Regardless of one's viewpoint, labels can be
applied and explained within the context of the particular moral theory
chosen.
An individual evaluates
2. Diferences between Appraisers and Actors.
another's act from his own moral perspective. That task becomes more
difficult once he realizes that the actor's sense of moral correctness may differ
radically from his own. For example, imagine that the observer is a
nonpacifist who must judge the refusal of a pacifist to submit to the draft. The
nonpacifist, who respects the pacifist's convictions, is likely to resist the simple
label "justified" or "excused" and will argue: "Paul's pacifist beliefs,
although understandable, are mistaken and therefore not justified, but Paul is
22. A utilitarian might admit that the aid was partially justified, in the sense that it was less
wrongful than ordinary aid to known murderers.
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justified in acting upon his strong convictions."-23 To act on one's own
convictions is regarded as morally virtuous and appropriate. To the extent
that he does so act, Paul is justified, but, insofar as Paul's act rests on a
mistaken moral evaluation, it is only excused. In one sense, the issue in this
situation is not one of responsibility since Paul has made a deliberate choice in
light of all the ascertainable relevant facts. One might say, however, that Paul
is less responsible for the wrongfulness of his act than if he did realize that it
was wrong.
In the converse situation, the actor behaves wrongly by his own moral
appraisal but correctly in the view of an observer. The nonpacifist evaluates
Paul's submission to the draft, knowing that Paul is a pacifist by conviction
who has allowed himself to be drafted because he does not want to appear
odd. 24 Unless Paul's reason for violating his convictions is one that reduces
the level of appropriate blame, excuse is not in issue: either Paul is justified or
his act is wrongful. Again, the observer is likely to resist an either-or
conclusion, arguing: "What Paul actually did was justified under a correct
moral appraisal of the choices but he was not justified in disregarding his own
judgment about what was right."
The examples discussed demonstrate that the simple labels ofjustification
and excuse are often too crude to express all the aspects of a moral
evaluation. Nevertheless, language is sufficiently rich to provide an
appropriate description of moral judgment. In contrast, the law is less
flexible.
IV
DISTINGUISHING JUSTIFICATIONS FROM EXCUSES IN THE LAw

In this section, after identifying those troublesome borderlines of moral
evaluation that create difficulty for the law, I suggest that the criminal law
ought not attempt to delineate bright-line distinctions between justifications
and excuses.
A.

Troublesome Borderlines in the Law

Some instances that create difficulty for moral labelling do not pose
significant problems for the law. For example, the law does not often concern
itself with situations where incidental harm predictably results from desirable
acts. Harm is often crucial to the definition of a crime but almost always
because it results from a culpable action. Thus, if Ann recklessly swings her
arm and strikes only air, she is guilty of no crime, but if she connects with
23. Alternatively, the observer might think that another's acts violate the rights of innocent
beings. Suppose the observer is an opponent of abortion, who must judge a doctor who performs
them, or a vegetarian believer in animal rights who must judge those who eat meat. These observers
would be unlikely to feel comfortable with the label "justified," and would wish instead to make plain
that the other's moral position is founded on a profound error.
24. The more obvious reason for submitting to the draft, that the pacifist fears going to jail for
not doing so, is not cited here because in the United States genuine pacifists do not have to go to jail.
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Ben's jaw, she has committed an assault. The law treats an actor's behavior as
justified when the actor correctly claims the act that predictably produced an
incidental harm was warranted.
The law aims to make individuals respect the interests of strangers. When
it demands accession to the rights or interests of strangers, it is ordinarily
inflexible. Apart from granting limited privileges not to testify against close
family members, the law does not ordinarily allow one to commit otherwise
criminal acts in the interests of benefiting close relatives. One exception to
this general principle is the defense of duress. The law of duress allows an
actor to respond to some threats against himself and the members of his
family even though an outsider would view the actor's resulting crime as
inflicting a greater harm than the action threatened against him. 2 5 Duress is
typically labelled an excuse, and any permitted preference for family members
should be so viewed, because the act was based on impairment of rational
judgment or unfair conditions of choice. The law does not view any such
preference as justified. Since the acts excused violate the more substantial
protected interests of strangers, 26 it would have been better, from the law's
point of view, if the actor had not yielded to the threat.
The formal law makes few concessions to actors who commit crimes based
on idiosyncratic views of what is morally required. Although sincere moral
27
convictions may affect the exercise of prosecutorial discretion or sentencing,
they generally do not serve as either justifications or excuses. On occasion, a
legislature creates a special exception, as Congress has done with respect to
conscientious objectors to military service. 28 However, these exceptions to
ordinary principles of liability are not typically labelled either justifications or
excuses.

25. It is anomalous that present American law does not recognize a similar defense for one who
is impelled to act by natural forces.
26. This statement may seem too simple if one considers partial justifications and the range of
morally permissible acts. The law's treatment is certainly consistent with the idea that a partial
justification as well as a full excuse is present.

Furthermore, even when resistance to duress is

preferable, submission may be morally permissible. Therefore, one cannot be sure if exoneration
rests on this broad idea ofjustification or on excuse. The response to these concerns is that the law's
labelling reflects the common view that infringement of the moral rights of innocent people is not

typically regarded as morally permissible when the predictable consequences are, on balance,
undesirable.
27. See generally Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality: Institutions of Amelioration, 67 VA. L. REV.
177 (1981).
28. Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 456() (West 1985). The courts also have carved
out other similar limited constitutional privileges. These privileges are primarily based on the free
exercise and free speech clauses, U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(because Amish believe that continued public education is contrary to religion and their way of life,
Amish are permitted to withdraw children from school after the eighth grade, notwithstanding the
state law mandating compulsory education to age 16); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943) (parents, Jehovah's Witnesses, are not criminally liable for contributing to the
delinquency of minors by encouraging their children not to salute the flag during the pledge of
allegiance where religious belief of the Jehovah's Witness is that the flag is a "graven image" and
cannot be honored); People v. Woody, 61 Cal: 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (not a
criminal offense for Navajo Indians to use peyote, a narcotic drug, in their religious rituals).
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The major problems for the law are factual misperceptions, the
coalescence of elements of justification and excuse, and varying standards of
moral appropriateness. Even these labelling difficulties do not arise in every
setting in which they would for moral evaluation. They do not, for example,
surface in the law when the actor's obvious behavior or the explanation of his
behavior puts him outside the reach of the basic elements of crime.
State citizens are divided among those who think adultery should be criminal, those
who think adultery is always or usually morally permissible, and those who think
adultery is at best morally excusable but not a proper subject for criminal punishment.
The latter two groups combine to successfullly repeal existing criminal sanctions
against adultery. Maude subsequently commits adultery.

Since Maude's behavior is not a concern of the criminal law, that law does not
label her act as justified, excused, or wrongful. 29 The law's failure to
distinguish between justifications and excuses extends to situations in which a
harm that the criminal law usually reaches is involved but some basic element
of a crime is missing. Suppose Ann's explanation of her swinging arm hitting
Ben is that she did not mean to hit Ben and had no idea he was nearby. If the
law accepts her claimed failure to perceive the facts, she has not committed
assault, which requires at least recklessness with regard to the chance of
harm.A0 Once it is clear that assault is absent, the criminal law has no occasion
to label Ann's conduct as justified or excused or to decide if her lack of
3
awareness of the risk to Ben involved some fault on her part. '
B.

Facts and Perceivable Facts

How should the law evaluate situations where an actor is mistaken about
justifying circumstances? Consider first the faultless factual appraisal.
1. Ann(l) strikes Ben, believing that Ben is trying to assault her. Anyone else
would have reached the same conclusion. In fact, Ben was only pretending to assault
Ann and intended to stop short of hitting her.

2. Ann(2) strikes Ben because she hates him, completely unaware that he was
about to detonate a bomb. Her action prevents the detonation.

There are at least three possible approaches to evaluating these
hypotheticals: (a) an actor's faultless appraisal should control, in which case
Ann(l) is justified and Ann(2) is not; (b) the actual facts should control, in
which case Ann(2) is justified and Ann(l) is not; and (c) justification depends
on an actor's being supported both by the actual facts and by his appraisal of
them, in which case neither Ann(l) nor Ann(2) is justified.
29. One might say that anything the criminal law permits is actually justified, but that seems
implausible if the behavior is wrong under other areas of the law. Adultery, for example, is still
viewed in many states as grounds for divorce.
30. See supra text accompanying note 1. Most modern American criminal statutes make clear
that recklessness requires subjective awareness of risk. Common law jurisdictions have not always
had this requirement. See, e.g., Beeman v. State, 232 Ind. 683, 692, 115 N.E.2d 919, 923 (1953) (in
upholding conviction under reckless homicide statute, Indiana Supreme Court stated that "[iut is
sufficient that the actor realizes, or should realize that there is a strong probability that such harm
may result").
31. That issue would be relevant if Ben sued Ann in tort.
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In the discussion on moral evaluation, I suggested that if one is concerned
with judging the actor, the actor's blameless perception of the facts ought to
be sufficient to support a justification. Ann(l) is not to be blamed for her
action, but Ann(2) is to be blamed for hers. Since the criminal law attempts to
make just such judgments about actors, it too should treat the faultless
mistaken appraisal as sufficient to support justification. The dominant import
of American law is to treat mistaken appraisals in this way.
One objection to this treatment of the faultless mistaken appraisal is that
32
justification necessarily depends on consonance with the true facts.
However, the concept of justification is sufficiently complex to encompass
those situations where an actor's appraisal of the facts is as good as anyone's
could be under the circumstances.
A second objection is that an actor is unlikely to consider his action
justified when he feels remorse over sensible choices that turn out badly and
hurt others. 3 3 This argument fails, however, to account for the complexity of
the relationship between remorse and wrongdoing. Moral training may lead
one to feel remorse when he causes certain harms even where, in relatively
rare instances, one's causing those harms was not the result of a wrongful act.
A third objection is that the "actor's appraisal" approach leads to the
conclusion that both persons in a conflict of force may be justified. 34 The
answer to this objection is that despite its initial oddness, there is nothing
illogical about saying both persons are justified. In fact, that conclusion is
appropriate for situations that occasionally arise.
Each of the two other approaches to labelling acts as justified is more
problematic than the approach based on the actor's faultless appraisal. By
demanding that behavior conform with the unknowable actual facts, each
approach would break the link between legal justification and the appropriate
35
moral judgment of the actor. Neither approach regards Ann(l) as justified
even though she has committed no moral wrong.
The position that justification depends on consonancy with both subjective
appraisal and actual fact fails to explain adequately why the absence of either
support is enough to term an act unjustified, and why the presence of both is
needed to make an act justified. The view that justification depends
exclusively upon actual fact, on the other hand, avoids this oddity, but it
offends one's intuitive moral sense by treating Ann(l) as unjustified and
Ann(2) as justified. The appeal of this position lies not in its moral sensitivity
but in its legal conclusions. 36 An examination of this position, however,
shows that one can reach the conclusions without relying on this approach.
32. See, e.g., Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 972-80 (1985).
33. See, e.g., Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a justification or an Excuse for
Escape?, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1355, 1363 (1979).
34. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 32, at 975.
35. In any event, under either approach, Ann would not be punished, since her faultless factual
perception would give rise to an excuse.
36. See generally 2 P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 122 (1984).
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Although the actual facts approach labels the actions of Ann(2) as justified,
it does not absolve Ann of liability. Modem law no longer embraces the
notion that an actor can escape liability for his actions whenever the success of
his efforts would not amount to a crime. Under most current law, Ann(2)
would be guilty of attempted assault because she was trying to do something
that would have been assault if the facts had been as she thought. A good
argument can be made that Ann(2) should not be treated like the person who
has actually committed assault. 37 Because he has caused no harm, the person
who swings in order to hit, but misses, is guilty of a less serious offense than
one who hits. Similarly, Ann(2), on balance, has caused no harm since her act
turned out to be socially beneficial.38 Nonetheless, it is somewhat artificial to
speak of Ann(2)'s striking Ben as justified. What she did is not really regarded
as justified, since she remains subject to criminal penalties. It would be more
precise to term her act unjustified, but deserving of comparatively less
punishment than if she had caused the expected harm. Thus, even if one
accepts the practical conclusion yielded by the "actual facts" approach, the
conceptualization involved in that approach is highly strained. Therefore,just
as the moral judgment of the actor embraces such an idea, the law ought to
embrace the idea that justification exists where action is based on a faultless
39
appraisal of the facts.
How does one evaluate those situations where one's failure to correctly
appraise the facts is blameworthy? Suppose that the failure of Ann(l) to
realize that Ben was pretending was negligent. As discussed previously, such
an explanation may lead one to consider Ann(l) less responsible for the harm
caused than someone who was aware that his swinging fist was likely to strike
Ben. 40 If a choice must be made between labelling the act as "justified" or
"excused," the latter would be more precise. I address below whether the law
is to be faulted for not employing the more precise label.
C.

Coalescence of Elements

How should the law deal with situations in which elements ofjustification
and excuse coalesce? Confusion over the combination of these elements is
reflected both in the somewhat anomalous status of duress and in the largely
unconscious shift over time from the idea that necessity is an excuse to the
idea that it is a justification. Duress is typically labelled an excuse, 4 1 yet if
someone credibly threatens to kill three bystanders unless Ann steals a
bicycle, Ann surely must be considered justified in stealing the bicycle. Many
37. This distinction may not be that important in the context of assault, but consider the
significant difference between actual murder and attempted murder.
38. The connection between actual harm and the degree of liability is a matter for conjecture,
but it is assumed here that Ann(2) should be treated like the person who merely attempts assault.

39. This article does not consider appraisal that is reasonable but not the best that the actor, or
people generally, are capable of producing.
40. Consistent with the discussion of moral evaluation, I assume that the fact that one is careless
in not recognizing that one's act is justified does not affect how one's act should be labelled.
41.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985).
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jurisdictions now classify this type of reaction to a threat as a general
justification (or necessity). 4 2 In other jurisdictions, however, duress is the
only applicable defense. The treatment of necessity exclusively as a
justification produces an indefensible distinction between human threats and
"threats" from "natural forces." A person who commits an unjustified act in
response to a human threat that most people would not resist has the excuse
of duress. On the other hand, a person who performs an unjustified act in
response to a dire "threat" posed by flood or fire that most people would not
resist has no defense at all. Thus, a person who kills four strangers under the
credible threat that otherwise three members of his family will be killed may
successfully claim duress. However, a person who, in order to save his three
family members during a flood, grabs a boat that otherwise, to his knowledge,
would have been used to save four strangers, will have no defense since the
act is not justified and is not the result of a threat in the sense used in most
duress formulations.
The cleanest conceptual approach to these difficulties is one that parallels
the approach to moral evaluation discussed earlier. 43 Whether the
extraordinary influence on choice is natural exigency or human threat, one
ought first to look at whether an act is legally justified. If the act falls short of
being justified, one ought then to ask whether sufficient grounds for excuse
44
are present.
D.

Divergence of Moral Evaluation

The problem of legal labelling is more pressing than that of moral
appraisal because the law speaks with a single voice. As noted previously,
attaching labels to any particular act requires both a judgment about the act
and a theoretical framework to lend significance to the label.
A heavily armed group of bandits enters a small village and threatens to kill every
resident unless the villagers kill an enemy of the bandits who is hiding. The villagers
initially do not comply, and the outlaws kill all the members of one family, leaving the
villagers one hour to decide whether the killings will continue. The villagers give in
and kill the bandits' foe, saving the lives of the seventy remaining residents.

One may view the villagers' decision to kill in a number of different ways: it
might be regarded as the best possible solution, as the morally indifferent
product of an unresolvable dilemma, as less preferable than the decision not
to kill but within the range of morally permissible alternatives, or as definitely
wrong but excusable. Regardless of the viewpoint taken, most people would
agree that the villagers should not be punished. How well does a
determination that the killing is justified represent the first three positions? If
See id., § 3.02 and comment 1.
See supra section IIIB. The modern German penal law takes this approach. See
Strafgesetzbuch §§ 34-35 (W. Ger.). See generally Esser,JustificationandExcuse, 24 AM.J. COMP. L. 621,
622 (1976) ("According to the new general part of the German Penal Code, the distinction between
(objective) justification of act [§ 34] and mere (subjective, individual) excuse of the actor [§ 35] is
now expressly recognized as a matter of principle .... ").
44. A partial justification, rendering the act less wrongful, might be relevant in deciding whether
the act should be excused.
42.
43.
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the label "justified" means only that a decision is within a permissible range,
then it is an appropriate label for all three. But if "justified" is taken to signify
that a choice is preferable or indifferent, the label will not fairly reflect the
third position.
Because the law permits much behavior that is regarded as morally less
preferable than its possible alternatives, the "permissible decision" idea is
probably the justification notion that is best suited for the law. However, the
difficulty involved in distinguishing the "permissible decision" notion from
stronger concepts of justification and from excuse casts considerable doubt
on the usefulness of "permissible decision" as the basis for a systematic
elaboration of justification and excuse.
E.

Constraints on Legal Precision About Justification and Excuse

Certain features of the law pose significant limits on the appropriate
aspirations to precision in the categorization of justifications and excuses.
1. Limits in Applications to ParticularCases.
Criminal procedure presents a
significant barrier to any search for precision in characterization of individual
cases.
Sam has helped Thomas rob a grocery store. Sam claims that Thomas threatened
to kill him if he refused to help, but two bystanders say that they heard Thomas
threaten only to "beat the hell out of" Sam. The jurisdiction has formulated its
defenses so that an action that prevents harm greater than the crime is justified, and an
action that prevents a harm lesser than the crime may be excused if ordinary people
would have made a similar choice. In this jurisdiction the judge decides whether a
claim of justification is established if certain facts are present.

Sam has possible claims of justification and duress. Of course, if the
prosecutor does not proceed with the case, or Sam agrees to plead guilty to a
lesser offense, the system will provide no clear indication whether a
justification or excuse was actually present. But suppose that the case goes to
trial and the jury hears the conflicting evidence about the threat. The judge
instructs the jury that if Sam actually thought he would be killed, his aid was
justified. He also instructs that if Sam thought he would be beaten up, his aid
was not justified but excused, provided that ordinary people would have
reacted the same way to the threat. The jury returns a general verdict of not
guilty. Observers will not know whether the jury determined that Sam was
justified or whether he was excused, or indeed, whether the jury reached a
definitive judgment on that question at all. One possibility is that the jurors
split on the question and, because resolution of the case did not require
agreement on the question, the jury never attempted to answer it.
The system might surmount this impediment to the application of precise
labels by requiring more specific responses from the jury about their
decisions, as is the rule with insanity acquittals. The currently predominant
use of the general verdict, however, is thought to give greater latitude to the
jury. If the system values that result, its sacrifice to the interests of labelling
precision would be a dubious exchange.
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The threat example is by no means unique. A similar result obtains when
a negligent belief in justifying circumstances will exonerate an actor from
liability for a crime that requires purpose, knowledge, or recklessness. Recall
the example of Ann(l) striking Ben and claiming that she was sure Ben was
attacking her. In jurisdictions that correlate the level of culpability regarding
justifying circumstances with the level of culpability for the underlying
offense, Ann, if she is telling the truth, is not guilty of an assault. She has not
been reckless in supposing that a justifying circumstance existed, and
recklessness is the minimum culpability level for assault. Suppose the law
labelled action based on a negligent belief in justifying circumstances as
"excused" and action based on a faultless belief as "justified." A jury
believing Ann would not need to decide whether her belief was faultless or
careless because she would be acquitted in either event.
These examples illustrate that so long as general verdicts prevail, not even
the most precise labels will yield precise applications to many cases. Thus,
labelling remains of limited utility.
2. The Necessary Crudeness of Legal Categories.
When one uses a term in
moral evaluation, one can include any qualifying phrases or explanations.
Statutory law is necessarily much cruder. It must choose one label or another
without subtle elaboration. Although capable of greater nuances than
statutes, judicial opinions often must also settle for relative simplicity.
There is a second respect in which the law is necessarily cruder than
morality. Legal categorization must usually be responsive to facts
discoverable in the legal process. It cannot draw important lines on the basis
of differences that are unascertainable by observers. One reason, for
example, not to require retreat even if the actor knows he can retreat with
perfect safety is that it is so difficult for an outsider to appraise whether the
actor realized that retreat would be safe. By contrast, moral evaluation does
not call. upon an individual to make an authoritative determination of the
morality of someone else's actions. Factors that are hard to determine can be
considered critical to the evaluation, and the evaluation can be highly
tentative or expressed in terms that depend on unknown facts: "What John
did was immoral if he was aware .

.

.

."

Insofar as a particular legal

categorization does not affect the outcome, the need for distinctions that rely
on discoverable facts is less than if the outcome hinges on the categorization.
The distinction between justification and excuse is not so important when a
defendant is destined to be acquitted. Yet, concern about lines that depend
on undiscoverable facts remains. If most legal lines matter for results and
must be designed for practical application, the law may not be the best vehicle
for introducing new distinctions that are neither practically applicable nor
vital for legal outcomes.
Furthermore, in establishing guidelines for permissible behavior, the law
must focus on a few key factors, omitting others that might enter into moral
evaluation. In the United States, one can use deadly force to defend himself
in his home even if he could retreat with perfect safety. Most statutes do not
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draw distinctions based on the assailant's mental state or on his relationship
to the homeowner. Those who think that an ordinary failure to retreat falls
within the zone of morally permissible behavior would judge more harshly a
homeowner who shoots his angry brother when he could retreat with safety
than a homeowner who shoots a stranger in that situation. Perhaps the law
should adopt a similar distinction, but there are limits to the number of
factors the law can sensibly consider.
The law's necessary crudeness precludes legal labelling from precisely
tracking moral evaluation. If terming the use of deadly force "justified" when
the actor knew retreat would be safe implies that standing one's ground is
morally equivalent to retreating, the label is somewhat misleading, even when
the assailant is a stranger. In fact, most people would regard retreat as
morally preferable. Justification is an even more misleading term in the case
of mentally ill and family member assailants, since the predominant view is
that the actor in such cases is at best excused.
F.

The Law's Resolution of Disagreements and Uncertainties

Because people hold varying moral perspectives, they judge particular acts
differently. For instance, people who value highly the defense of right believe
the use of deadly force is morally better or at least the moral equivalent of
retreating. Others prefer retreating but regard standing one's ground as
morally permissible. Still others think that standing one's ground is wrong,
but that a failure to retreat is excusable, considering human pride, the general
emotional response to attack, and the short time for response. Finally, there
are those who would not punish the actor who stands his ground even though
they are uncertain how to regard his use of deadly force.
Lawmakers must resolve these uncertainties and disagreements if they
wish to provide precise labels. Those who conceive of the criminal law as a
proper vehicle for moral enlightenment may wish the law to give clear
answers to moral questions that divide and trouble the community. On the
other hand, those who think the law should primarily react to the moral
understandings of the citizenry will question the wisdom of lawmakers
undertaking to settle matters of general moral controversy.
G.

The Tolerability of Imprecision

I have thus far identified some of the substantial costs involved in
attempting to achieve comprehensive and precise distinctions between
justification and excuse. Such attempts at categorization would achieve
minimal practical value at the cost of considerable time and energy.
Furthermore, the resulting labels would inevitably be misleading by
purporting definitively to answer questions about which people are deeply
divided.
These costs lead one to wonder whether the law is always flawed by its
present imprecision. Is it a flaw that the use of force in self-defense is labelled
a justification even if in some situations the decision to stand one's ground
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should more precisely be considered an excuse? Is it a flaw that for a crime
requiring reckless conduct, an act based on a negligent belief in a justifying
circumstance is labelled ajustification? Is it a flaw that the "excuse" of duress
undoubtedly covers some circumstances in which submission to coercion is
morally justified? The law's treatment of justification and excuse should
generally track moral understanding. However, the law is necessarily crude.
Its present imprecision is itself a caution that the law does not attempt to affix
a precise moral label to each instance of behavior. Recognition of the goals
the law can reasonably accomplish may be much healthier than pretentious
aspirations to make the law the arbiter of every doubtful moral question.
The law's treatment of the basic elements of crime confirms this judgment.
As generally used, the terms "justification" and "excuse" apply to situations
that the law does not regard as crimes. If Ann's swinging arm injures Ben, she
might offer an excuse, saying: "I'm sorry, but I didn't realize you were there."
Alternatively, she might offer a justification: "You saw that I was swinging my
arms to teach dramatic effect to my acting class; why didn't you pay
attention?" As long as Ann was unaware that she might hit Ben, she has not
committed an assault, and the criminal law does not engage in labelling to
decide whether her arm swinging was justified or only excused.
If this state of affairs is unacceptable, the criminal law should begin making
moral judgments about acts that fall short of amounting to crimes. Perhaps
the law should evaluate every act that causes harm. The ability to develop
such a harm-based approach to criminal law labelling is doubtful, particularly
since some frequent harms that usually do not involve crimes may be the basis
of criminal liability if committed with a certain kind of intent. Viable or not,
the harm-based approach would radically transform modern American
criminal law.
If the law's failure to label acts that do not amount to crimes is acceptable,
then the question arises whether a failure to label precisely is unacceptable
when other circumstances preclude liability. If the law need not determine
whether Ann is justified or excused when she accidentally hits Ben, why need
it determine precisely whether she is justified or excused when she strikes in
mistaken self-defense? Conceivably, mislabelling is worse than no labelling.
But if no one expects precision from legal labels, mislabelling seems no worse
than a failure to label.
Statutes and judicial opinions should not aspire to comprehensiveness and
precision in distinguishing justifications from excuses. This conclusion does
not suggest that scholars should eschew attempts to build comprehensive
systems. They are free to employ moral theory, to engage in evaluations of
particular situations, and to fully explain the meanings of the terms they
choose. A scholar may well be able to develop a comprehensive distinction
between legal justification and legal excuse, but he should not expect the
necessarily crude materials of statutes and opinions to endorse that
distinction.

